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 II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Nature of the Case 
This is the state’s appeal from the district court’s order granting Defendant 
Lacey Killeen’s motion to suppress.  R. 95-97. 
B.  General Course of Proceedings 
On a slow night just after midnight on August 14, 2016, Boise Police Officer 
Jason Green patrolled a Walmart parking lot with his drug detention dog while 
“running” the license plates of random vehicles. Tr. p. 35, ln. 11 - p. 36, ln. 9. Officer 
Green encountered Ms. Killeen’s vehicle and recognized her name from an occasion 
several months earlier in which she was present with someone arrested on drug 
related charges. Tr. p. 33, ln. 1-4; p. 35, ln. 14-24. Officer Green decided to follow 
Ms. Killeen’s vehicle until a traffic infraction allowed him to initiate a traffic stop 
during which he could utilize his drug detection dog on the vehicle. Tr. p. 9, ln. 4-14; 
p. 29, ln. 4-11; p. 32, ln. 3-19; p. 36, ln. 10-16; p. 40, ln. 5-21. 
Approximately four miles later, Officer Green observed Ms. Killeen change 
lanes on the freeway after signaling for less than the required five seconds. Tr. p.10, 
ln. 6-10; p. 22, ln. 1-13; Exh. 1, 1:38-2:23. After another (correct) lane change, the 
officer noted the vehicle drift a few inches into the other lane while signaling to 
change lanes. Tr. p. 10, ln. 11 – p.11, ln. 5, p.22, ln. 2-13. Officer Green initiated a 
traffic stop based on the two infractions. Tr. p.11, ln. 6-15.  
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Officer Green requested and received Ms. Killeen’s license and proof of 
insurance. Tr. p.12, ln. 3-13; p.13, ln. 16-22. The passenger identified himself as 
Brian McGraw and admitted to being on parole in response to Officer Green’s 
question regarding probation or parole status. Tr. p.12, ln. 14-25; p.13, ln. 16-22. 
Officer Green did not smell drugs or alcohol and neither passenger moved in a 
threatening manner. Mr. McGraw’s parole status nonetheless solidified Officer 
Green’s decision to utilize his narcotics detection canine around the vehicle. Tr. p.
13, ln. 1-8; p. 28, ln. 24 - p. 29, ln. 11; p. 32, ln. 3-19. 
Meanwhile, Boise Police Officer Plaisted — also a canine handler — arrived 
on the scene and stood the passenger window as Officer Green spoke with Ms. 
Killeen at the driver’s side window. Tr. p. 41, ln. 8-16; p. 44, ln. 14-18; p. 45, ln. 5 - 
p.46, ln. 9. Dispatch verified that Ms. Killeen’s license and registration were valid 
and that neither occupant had outstanding warrants. Tr. p. 14, ln. 6-14.  
Officer Green then informed Ms. Killeen that he was going to write a citation 
for failing to maintain a lane. Exhibit 1, 5:23-5:31. Officer Green continued “so in a 
minute I’m going to begin that” but “for the time being” directed Ms. Killeen to exit 
her vehicle. Exhibit 1, 5:23 - 5:35.  Ms. Killeen inquired “why do I have to get out of 
the car?” and Officer Green replied: “Well, because in a minute here . . . I’ll have 
that conversation with you out here.” Exhibit 1, 5:40-5:50.  
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After Ms. Killeen exited the vehicle, Officer Green informed her that he 
planned to walk his drug dog around the vehicle while the citation was being 
written. Exhibit 1, 6:25-6:33. Officer Green inquired regarding the presence of any 
narcotics and sought consent to search, which she denied and declined. Exhibit 1, 
6:37-6:41. Ms. Killeen informed the officer that Mr. McGraw’s parole did not allow 
him to search her car and Officer Green responded that he was “not even going off 
his parole.” Exhibit 1, 7:02-7:16; Tr p. 15, ln. 7-14. 
Officer Green directed Ms. Killeen to sit on the curb, retrieved his citation 
book and began writing the citation. Tr. p. 15, ln. 6-9; p. 30, ln. 11-15. Officer 
Plaisted removed Mr. McGraw from the vehicle, sat him on the curb and turned 
down Officer Green’s overhead lights. Tr. p. 47, ln. 3-13; p. 52, ln. 5-18. Officer 
Green handed his citation book to Officer Plaisted, who then went to the rear of 
Officer Green’s vehicle and turned off the overhead lights. Tr. p.15, ln. 23 – p.16, ln. 
5; p. 53, ln. 19 - p. 54, ln. 24. Officer Plaisted walked around the patrol vehicle and 
positioned himself where he could simultaneously observe the vehicle occupants and 
cover Officer Green when he ran his canine around Ms. Killeen’s car. Exhibit 2, 
3:02-3:35; Tr. 70, 18 - p. 71, ln. 4. With Officer Plaisted in position, Officer Green 
retrieved his drug dog. 3:11-3:35. Forty seconds after receiving the citation from 
Officer Green, Officer Plaisted “ostensibly” filled it out on an intermittent basis 
while covering Officer Green. Tr. p.55, ln. 4-; p. 70, ln. 22 - p. 71, ln. 6  
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The dog alerted at an open window. Tr. p.16, ln. 8-18. The officer searched 
the vehicle and found marijuana, methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Tr. p.17, 
ln. 11 – p.18, ln. 9. The state charged Ms. Killeen with felony possession of a 
controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia. R. 37-38. The district court 
consolidated Mr. McGraw’s case with Ms. Killeen’s case. R. 51. 
Ms. Killeen moved to suppress, arguing that the officer extended the stop to 
accomplish the dog sniff by interrogating her regarding drugs and seeking consent 
to search.  R 62-70, 88-90. The district court found that while the stop was “entirely 
pre textual,” it was objectively supported by the traffic violations. Tr. p. 69, ln. 21 - 
p. 70, ln. 1 The district court found that Officer Green lacked any basis to expand 
the scope of the stop and that he abandoned its purpose when he handed the 
citation to Officer Plaisted. Tr. p. 70, ln. 7-15. The district court also noted Officer 
Plaisted delayed resuming the citation and then intermittently wrote the citation 
while covering Officer Green. Tr. p. 70, ln. 18 - p. 71, ln. 7. The district court 
concluded Officer Green abandoned the stop’s purpose within the meaning of 
Rodriguez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015) and State v. Linze, 161 
Idaho 605, 389 P.3d 150 (2016) and granted Ms. Killeen’s motion. R 93-94. The state 
appealed. R 95-97.  
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 III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The state phrases the issue on appeal as:  
Did the district court err in concluding that the initial officer’s action of 
handing the ticket book to a second officer, combined with the second officer’s 
actions of turning off the flashing lights on a patrol car and paying attention to his 
surroundings while writing the ticket, constituted an abandonment of the traffic 
stop? 
Ms. Killeen re-phrases the issue on appeal as: 
Should this Court affirm because the district court’s finding that the dog sniff 
added time to the traffic stop was supported by substantial evidence? 
 IV.  ARGUMENT 
On review from the district court’s order on a motion to suppress, this Court 
freely reviews constitutional principles while accepting the trial court's factual 
findings when supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Munoz, 149 
Idaho 121, 128, 233 P.3d 52, 59 (2010); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 
309 (2004). The trial court has wide discretion to determine witness credibility, the 
weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn. 
Munoz, 149 Idaho at 128, 233 P.3d at 59; State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.
3d 1203, 1209 (2009). This Court also examines the “implicit” findings that support 
the trial court's ruling in the absence of an explicit factual ruling. State v. Schevers, 
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132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).   
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts must presume that a warrantless search 
is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 
118, 266 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.
2d 196, 198 (1995). The state may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that 
a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Id. 
 A detention’s scope must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 561, 112 P.3d 848, 851 (Ct. 
App. 2005). “A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that 
violation.”  Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. Beyond determining whether to issue a 
traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] 
stop such as checking the driver's license, determining whether there are 
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's 
registration and proof of insurance. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. An officer can also 
investigate issues unrelated to the initial basis for the stop if the routine traffic stop 
reveals circumstances justifying a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Aguirre, 
141 Idaho 560, 562, 112 P.3d 848, 850 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 
357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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 An individual “may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, 
objective grounds for doing so.” State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651-52, 51 P.3d 
461, 465-66 (Ct. App. 2002), citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 498. A seizure justified only by 
a police-observed traffic violation becomes unlawful “‘if it is prolonged beyond the 
time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the 
violation.” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612, citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 
(2005). In the context of a dog sniff, the critical question is whether conducting the 
sniff prolongs or adds time to the stop rather than whether the dog sniff occurs 
before or after the officer issues a ticket. Id. at 1616. Any deviation from the traffic 
stop’s original purpose inevitably lengthens the time needed to complete that 
purpose. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608-609, 389 P.3d at 153-54. 
  Here, the district court correctly determined that Officer Green “abandoned” 
the purpose of the stop by deviating from its purpose to facilitate the dog sniff. The 
state asks this Court to reverse, arguing that “handing the citation book to another 
officer so the second officer could complete filling out the ticket . . .  was exactly the 
opposite of abandoning the purpose of the stop.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 6. 
 However, in addition to the time spent physically handing the citation to the 
second officer, the fact that Officer Green handed over the citation-writing task at all 
added time to the stop. See Tr., p.58, ln. 10-17 (Officer Plaisted acknowledged it took 
him more time to complete the citation than it would have for Officer Green). The 
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district court also found that Officer Plaisted “ostensibly” wrote the citation while 
covering Officer Green and that he did not continually write the citation during that 
time. Tr. p. 70, ln. 22 - p. 71, ln. 6. This finding is supported by Officer Plaisted’s 
video recording. See also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616 (“on-scene investigation into 
other crimes” is a detour from traffic stop’s mission and “safety precautions taken in 
order to facilitate such detours” do not justify prolonging the stop).  
The district court correctly found that Officer Green abandoned the purpose of 
the stop when he assigned Officer Plaisted with the citation writing. The district 
court also correctly found that Officer Plaisted did not continually write the citation 
while covering Officer Green. These deviations added time to the stop and thus 
violated the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The district court correctly suppressed all fruits of the dog sniff.  
Moreover, Officer Green also deviated from the initial purpose of the stop 
when he removed Ms. Killeen from her vehicle so that he could inform her that he 
intended to use his drug dog and seek consent to search her vehicle. Officer Green 
claimed he removed Ms. Killeen for safety reasons related to retrieving his citation 
book but acknowledged that Officer Plaisted was already standing at the passenger 
window at that time. Tr. p. 15, ln. 1-5; p. 27, ln. 2-5. Requiring Ms. Killeen and Mr. 
McGraw to exit the vehicle facilitated the dog sniff and was unrelated to citing Ms. 
Killeen for failing to maintain her lane. See also Tr. p. 67, ln. 24 - p. 68, ln. 7.  
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Further, rather than begin writing a citation after Ms. Killeen exited the 
vehicle, Officer Green instead informed her that he planned to walk his drug dog 
around the vehicle. Exhibit 1, 6:25-6:33. Officer Green asked whether his dog would 
alert on any narcotics and asked for permission to search the vehicle. Exhibit 1, 
6:37-7:16; Tr. p. 15, ln. 7-14. Officer Green did not retrieve his citation book until 
after Ms. Killeen denied consent to search. 
Thus, Officer Green abandoned the purpose of the stop from the time he 
removed Ms. Killeen from the vehicle until he retrieved his citation book. While the 
district court did not make explicit findings regarding this evidence, the implicit 
finding supports its ruling, is consistent with its finding that the stop was pre 
textual, and is supported substantial evidence. 
The state’s primary complaint in this appeal appears to be that the delay was 
minimal. However, Rodriguez applies to all extensions of traffic stops including those 
that could reasonably be considered de minimis. Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 
153. Officers are free to target motorists based on vague hunches (as occurred here), 
based on racial profiling or based on whether the vehicle bears an Oregon or 
Washington license plate. Where any de minimis traffic violation provides an officer 
with an opportunity to use his drug detection dog, it seems only fair that law 
enforcement’s de minimis detour from the justification for the stop requires 
exclusion of the evidence.  
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V.  CONCLUSION   
Officer Green followed and stopped Ms. Killeen’s vehicle in hopes of using his 
drug detection dog. Officers Green and Plaisted deviated from the stop’s only 
justification — issuing a citation for failing to maintain lane — in order to facilitate 
the drug sniff on several occasions. The district court correctly concluded that the 
officers abandoned the stop’s purpose within the meaning of Rodriguez and Linze. 
This Court should therefore affirm the district court’s order granting the motion to 
suppress. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of September, 2017. 
      FYFFE LAW 
  
       /s/  Robyn Fyffe           
 ROBYN FYFFE     
  Attorney for Lacey Killeen 
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